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RECENT DECISIONS
CRIMINAL LAW-SEARCH AND SEIZURE-SEIZURE OF BACK-
YARD DRUG CACHE HELD INCIDENT TO ARREST IN HOUSE.
FIXEL V. STATE, 256 So. 2d 27 (Fla. 1971).
The defendant was convicted for possession of heroin. During a
surveillance, police observed the entry and departure of known
narcotics pushers to and from the defendant's apartment, and observed
that during these visits the defendant went to a cache in his backyard,
each time taking a package into the house. Acting upon the tip of a
"reliable informant" that a large quantity of narcotics was in the
defendant's apartment, the police obtained a search warrant, arrested
the defendant in the apartment and picked up the cache outside. At the
same time, the officers executed the search warrant, but found no
narcotics in the apartment.' The District Court of Appeal of Florida
held that the seizure was incident to a lawful arrest.2
The major problems presented in this case are two: first, does the
determination that the object sought is contraband justify the
extension of the scope of a search incident to a lawful arrest from the
area under the "immediate" control of the arrestee to those areas under
his "reasonable" control;3 and, second, is the search of the backyard,
incident to a lawful arrest inside the apartment, "reasonable" in the
sense of the fourth amendment?
The limited power of search and seizure is predicated on the fourth
amendment of the United States Constitution.4 A search and seizure
made without a warrant will be held reasonable only in limited
situations: (1) where incident to a lawful arrest; (2) with consent; and
(3) under exigent circumstances.'
The authorized scope of a search incident to a lawful arrest has had
an inconsistent judicial history. The first case to discuss the
constitutionality of a warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest was
Weeks v. United States.6 In Weeks, after the defendant was arrested
some distance away from his home, the officers conducted a
warrantless search of his residence. Although the Court held the search
1. For the purpose of this analysis it will be assumed that the search was made after the ar-
rest, not before. It should be noted, however, that Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 8,
Fixel v. State, 256 So. 2d 27 (Fla. 1971), claims that the search was made before the arrest.
2. Fixel v. State, 256 So. 2d 27, 29 (Fla. 1971).
3. "Reasonable control" for the purpose of this paper is defined as the area where the sub-
ject is located at the time of arrest, plus those areas where it is reasonable to believe that
he could exercise control during the time frame of arrest. This would include, but not be
limited to, areas through which the arrestee would pass while in custody.
4. U.S. CONST. amend. IV:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and par-
ticularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
5. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
6. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
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to be invalid, they did say in dictum that a search of the person could
be made at the time of arrest for fruits of the crime.7
A further expansion was made by Carroll v. United States.8 In
Carroll, the defendant was stopped while transporting contraband
liquor in his car, and a search incident to Carroll's arrest revealed the
liquor. In upholding the validity of the search, the Carroll Court
expanded the Weeks' dictum to include that which is found in the
arrestee's immediate control.9
The area of a lawful search incident to an arrest was expanded even
further that same year in Agnello v. United States. ' 0 In this case, while
holding the search invalid (since the search was that of the house of an
alleged conspirator several blocks from the place of arrest), the Agnello
Court did say, again in dictum, that arresting officers had the right to
search the place where the arrest is made and seize things connected
with the crime.' '
Two years later, in Marron v. United States' 2 the Court affirmed the
dictum of Agnello. In Marron, officers making a lawful search of
premises where intoxicating liquors were being unlawfully sold arrested
the person in charge of the premises and, incident to arrest, seized
books and papers not described in the search warrant. The Marron
Court held that when an arrest is made for an offense occurring on the
premises, the scope of search extends to all parts of the premises used
for the unlawful purpose.' 3
The expansion of Marron to all those parts of the premises used for
the unlawful purpose was somewhat limited in Go-Bart Importing Co.
v. United States.' " In Go-Bart, officers entered the office of the
defendants, made lawful arrests and searched all three rooms of the
office, seizing papers from a desk, safe, and other parts of the office. In
holding this search unlawful, the Court distinguished Go-Bart from
Marron by stating that in Go-Bart, the premises were not being used for
an unlawful purpose, nor was a crime committed in the officers'
presence.' ' Additionally, the Court reasoned that since the officers in
Go-Bart had sufficient time and information to obtain a search warrant,
their warrantless search was unreasonable and therefore illegal.' 6
The limited view of Go-Bart was reinforced that same year in United
States v. Lefkowitz,' " where officers with an arrest warrant searched
desk drawers and a cabinet. Although the officers held a valid arrest
7. Id. at 392.
8. 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
9. Id. at 158.
10. 269 U.S. 20 (1925).
11. Id. at 30.
12. 275 U.S. 192 (1927).
13. Id. at 199.
14. 282 U.S. 344 (1931).
15. Id. at 357-58.
16. Id. at 358.
17. 285 U.S. 452, 463-64 (1932).
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warrant, the Court held the seizure unconstitutional because: (1) a
crime had not been committed in the presence of the officers; (2) the
officers lacked sufficient probable cause to obtain a search warrant; and
(3) the arrest warrant did not authorize a search of the premises.
Thus far, the search of a place where an arrest was made, as
distinguished from a search of the person arrested, depended upon
whether the crime had been committed in the presence of the arresting
officer; all court-approved searches-incident beyond the person arrested
had occurred where the arresting officer witnessed the commission of a
crime.
A turbulent period followed Go-Bart and Lefkowitz. Within a
four-year span, three cases alternately expanded and limited the scope
of a lawful search incident to arrest. In Harris v. United States,' 8 the
Court took an expansionist view. An arrest warrant was obtained against
Harris for his alleged involvement in the interstate transportation of a
forged check. He was arrested in his apartment and officers undertook a
five-hour search of the entire four-room apartment. In the course of
this search, the police found a sealed envelope marked "George Harris,
Personal Papers", in his desk drawer. Opening this envelope, the officers
found altered selective service documents later used in convicting Harris
for draft law violations. The court rejected Harris' fourth amendment
claim, upholding the search of the entire four-room apartment as
incident to the lawful arrest.' 9
A year after the Harris decision, the Court took an about-face in
Trupiano v. United States.2 0 In Trupiano, officers raided an illicit
distillery, saw one of several persons operating the still, arrested him
and seized the still. The Court held the arrest lawful but the search
unlawful, reasoning that there was time to obtain a search warrant
before the raid; the Court held that officers must secure and use search
warrants whenever reasonably practicable. 2'
Trupiano was overruled two years later in United States v.
Rabinowitz.2 2 In Rabinowitz, police officers were informed that the
defendant was dealing in stamps with forged overprints. After securing
a warrant for his arrest, the police arrested the defendant in his office
and searched his desk, safe, and file cabinets for ninety minutes before
they seized the stamps. The Rabinowitz Court said that the test was not
whether it was reasonably practicable to obtain a search warrant, but
whether the search itself was reasonable.2 3 For the next decade, the
Harris-Rabinowitz rule was used, especially in lower court cases, to
18. 331 U.S. 145(1947).
19. Id. at 151-52.
20. 334 U.S. 699 (1948).
21. Id. at 705.
22. 339 U.S. 56 (1950).
23. Id. at 66.
[Vol. 2
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justify an expansion by police officers of the physical area of searches
incident to a lawful arrest.2 4
In 1969, the Supreme Court, increasingly sensitive to the fourth
amendment, overruled Harris and Rabinowitz in Chimel v. California.2 5
In Chimel, officers, with an arrest warrant but without a search
warrant, entered Chimel's house with the consent of his wife, and when
Chimel entered he was served with the arrest warrant. Although he
denied the officers' request to "look around," the police searched the
entire house on the basis of the lawful arrest and seized
certain items. The Chimel Court held that, assuming that the arrest was
valid, the warrantless search of the defendant's house could not be
constitutionally justified as incident to that arrest.2 6 The Court further
stated that a search incident to a lawful arrest is reasonable only if
limited to the arrestee's person or areas within his immediate control
(areas into which he might reach to grab a weapon or to destroy
evidence). 2 Thus, if the police desire to search any other area at the
time of the arrest or thereafter, they are required to obtain a search
warrant.2 8
The changed philosophy of the Court was also reflected in Coolidge
v. New Hampshire.2 9 In Coolidge, the defendant was arrested in his
house. A simultaneous thorough search of the car in his driveway,
including a vacuuming for hair samples, was made in order to seek
evidence which would link the defendant to a recent murder. The Court
held that the search and seizure of the automobile were not sustainable
as incident to a lawful arrest. Although this search was made prior to
Chimel, and Chimel was held not to be retroactive,3 0 the Coolidge
Court took judicial notice of Chimel and its narrowing of the
permissible scope of a search incident to an arrest. 3 1
The holding in Fixel v. State3 2 is unique for several reasons. First, it
takes the holding of Chimel (limiting the search incident to an arrest to
the arrestee's person or areas within his immediate control) and
expands it to areas not only outside of the arrestee's reach, but outside
his house and in his backyard. Second, the court makes a distinction
between contraband and mere evidence.
24. See, e.g., Kernick v. United States, 242 F.2d 818 (8th Cir. 1957); Clifton v. United States,
224 F.2d 329 (4th Cir. 1955); Rhodes v. United States, 224 F.2d 348 (5th Cir. 1955); United
States v. Jackson, 149 F. Supp. 937 (D.D.C. 1957), affd. 250 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1957);
Smith v. United States, 254 F.2d 751 (D.C. Cir. 1958); United States v. Fowler, 17 F.R.D.
499 (S.D. Cal. 1955).
25. 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
26. Id. at 768.
27. Id. at 763.
28. Id.
29. 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
30. Williams v. United States, 401 U.S. 646 (1971).
31. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 456 (1971).
32. 256 So. 2d 27 (Fla. 1971).
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The Fixel court, while taking note of the Coolidge holding,
distinguished its case on the grounds that, while Coolidge was
concerned with "mere evidence," 3" the objects seized in Fixel's
backyard were contraband.3 4  The Fixel court implies that the
requirements for warrantless seizure of contraband are necessarily less
stringent than the requirements for seizure of mere evidence. 3 5
While on the surface Fixel seems to oppose the holdings of both
Chimel and Coolidge, it can be construed as being merely an attempt by
the court to expand the areas allowed for a search incident to a lawful
arrest. This apparent expansion was made by distinguishing a reasonable
search for mere evidence from a reasonable search for contraband.
Chimel and Coolidge, the most recent Supreme Court holdings on the
subject, limit the scope of a search incident to arrest to those areas
under the "immediate" control of the arrestee, while Fixel broadens
the scope of the search for contraband to include those areas under the
"reasonable" control of the arrestee. Both Chimel and Coolidge,
however, emphasize that fourth amendment "reasonableness" is the
ultimate criterion by which a search incident to a lawful arrest must be
judged.
The rationale for the Fixel decision rests in the distinction between
mere evidence and contraband. While this distinction between Fixel and
Coolidge may be valid, it does not appear to justify the broad
expansion in scope of a search incident to a lawful arrest to the point it
has been carried by this Florida court.
As defined by Chimel, a search incident to a lawful arrest must be
limited to the arrestee's person or areas within his immediate control.
Even if the area for cases involving contraband were extended to what
is reasonable, it surely would not reach beyond the walls or barriers
where the arrestee is found, or to areas through which the arrestee
would not pass while in police custody. Therefore, without even
questioning the theoretical distinction drawn by Fixel, the application
of that distinction to the facts does not appear to justify the court's
conclusion.
Whereas Fixel could be construed as being consistent with the law
espoused by Coolidge, it certainly violates the spirit of the Coolidge
33. 403 U.S. at 471.
34. It is important to note that the destruction of the distinction between mere evidence and
contraband in Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967), refers only to the status of the
seized objects after it has already been determined that the search itself was lawful. The
distinction between mere evidence and contraband is a relevant factor, however, before
the determination has been made as to the legality of the search.
35. 256 So. 2d at 29:
In the case before us the distinguishing facts are: (1) the initial intrusion was le-
gitimate because the police had observed the commission of a crime, i.e., the sale
of heroin to known pushers. Therefore, there was probable cause to enter on the
premises and arrest the defendant; (2) a search was not necessary because the po-
lice observed the replacement of the heroin; (3) heroin is contraband and is a dan-
gerous substance.
[Vol. 2
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holding, as well as that of Chimel. Moreover, since the facts of the Fixel
case indicate an obvious practicability of obtaining a search warrant for
the backyard without risk of destruction of the object of the seizure, a
warrantless seizure does not appear to be reasonable. As the late Justice
Harlan articulated in his dissent to United States v. White:3 6 ,
... Official investigatory action that impinges on privacy must
typically, in order to be constitutionally permissible, be
subjected to the warrant requirement....
If the scope of searches incident to lawful arrest is to be extended
(even if limited to situations involving contraband), it is probable that
law enforcement officials will withhold service of an arrest warrant
until the subject is in an area the police want to search but for which
they lack probable cause to obtain a search warrant. This precise point
was raised in Chimel. 3 7
The above situation is analogou to delaying service of a search
warrant until a time when the executing officers know that the subject
of the order is absent. In United States v. Gervato,3 ' officers armed
with a warrant to search the defendant's premises delayed service until
a time when they were sure no one was present. After their knocks had
gone unanswered, the officers broke into the premises and conducted a
search. In holding this search unreasonable, the Gervato court, quoting
from Miller v. United States,3" stated:
4 0
.,. Every householder, the good and the bad, the guilty and the
innocent, is entitled to the protection designed to secure the
common interests against unlawful invasion of the house.
In conclusion, Mr. Justice Bradley's admonition almost a century ago
in Boyd v. United States4 ' bears repeating here:
It may be that it is the obnoxious thing in its mildest and least
repulsive form; but illegitimate and unconstitutional practices
get their first footing in that way, namely, by silent approaches
and slight deviations from legal modes of procedure. This can
only be obviated by adhering to the rule that constitutional
provisions for the security of person and property should be
liberally construed. A close and literal construction deprives
them of half their efficacy and heads to gradual depreciation of
the right, as it consisted more in sound than in substance. It is
36. 401 U.S. 745, 781 (dissenting opinion).
37. 395 U.S. at 767.
38. 340 F. Supp. 454 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
39. 357 U.S. 301 (1958).
40. 340 F. Supp. at 464.
41. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
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the duty of courts to be watchful for the constitutional rights
of the citizen, and against any stealthy encroachments
thereon.4 2 t J.M.V.
TORTS-LIABILITY OF A LAND OWNER TO INADVERTENT
TRESPASSERS IN MARYLAND-OWNERS OF A WATCHDOC
HELD NOT LIABLE FOR DAMAGES TO TRESPASSERS. BRAM-
BLE V. THOMPSON, 264 Md. 518, 287 A.2d 265 (1972).
In Bramble v. Thompson,' adults (plaintiffs) were boating in the
daytime when they tied up at the defendants' pier. After the plaintiffs
disembarked, they were attacked by a German shepherd dog, which
defendants kept for the purpose of protecting their business property,
including the pier.
Although the owners knew of the dog's vicious propensities, the
court of appeals held that demurrers in favor of the defendants were
properly sustained2 because the plaintiffs "... failed to allege that a
relationship existed between the parties which imposed a duty upon
[defendants] to prevent their dog from injuring [the plaintiffs] ."' In
Maryland no duty is owed by a property owner to a trespasser,4 and
42. Id. at 635.
t The Court of Appeal of Florida, after holding that the seizure of heroin was lawful as a
search incident to a valid arrest, cited "Cf. Cobb v. State, Fla. App. 1968, 213 So.2d
492." That case holds that the grounds of a building, even within the curtilage, are not
protected by the fourth amendment, and evidence secured therefrom by a trespassing
police officer is admissible. Thus, by justifying the search herein, the court apparently is
eager to avoid reliance on Cobb. This casenote of necessity assumes that a backyard is
protected by the fourth amendment.
A petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus was brought in the federal district court and
denied: Fixel v. Wainwright, No. 72-922-CIV-JE (S.D. Fla., filed Oct. 25, 1972). That
court's opinion was based on the open-view doctrine, and it also failed to address itself
to the threshold question presented by Cobb. The situation is further complicated by the
fact, brought out for the first time by this court, that Fixel was a mere tenant, and that the
backyard was held by the trial court to be a "common area."
Further, it deserves mention that in discussing the open view doctrine, the district
court alluded to the inadvertency requirement set forth in Coolidge v. New Hampshire,
403 U.S. 443 (1971), but made no attempt to apply that requirement to the facts of this
case. The undisputed facts of the case indicate that the surveillance in question was
planned, and not in the least inadvertent. There also appears to be serious question as
to whether the police were lawfully in the position from which the "open view" was
made (a shed within the hedged curtilage).
1. 264 Md. 518, 287 A.2d 265 (1972).
2. At the trial court a demurrer was sustained for the defendants, and the plaintiffs were
given leave to amend their pleading. When the plaintiffs failed to amend within the al-
loted time, the trial court entered a judgement of non pros. The plaintiffs then initiated
another suit alleging that they were only "inadvertent trepassers." A demurrer to this
second action was sustained by the trial court, without leave to amend, on the basis that
the plaintiffs failed to allege the breach of any duty owed them. Appeals from both judg-
ments were consolidated and were before the Court of Appeals in the instant case.
3. Bramble v. Thompson, 265 Md. 518, 521, 287 A.2d 265, 267 (1972).
4: "[T]he owner of land owes no duty to a trepasser or licensee, even one of tender years,
except to abstain from willful or wanton misconduct and entrapment." Fopma v.
